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Germany's "social market economy" has its roots both in
historical experience and in a value orientation centered around
the individual. The immediate historical background is to be
found in the years of an Orwellian dictatorship repressing
individual tastes and individual behavior. Another aspect of the
German experience was the interventionism of the state and the
central planning mechanism that slowly developed in the late 19th
century and became dominant in the war economies and in the
thirties. The inflation of 1923, the repressed inflation of
1936-1948, the problem of the alienation of the worker in the
19th century and the endogenous erosion of competition through
large firms also formed part of the historical background. The
consensus of the founding fathers of the Grundgesetz was a value
orientation stressing individual freedom, human dignity and the
subsidiarity of societal organization.
Paper prepared for the German-American Conference on "Federal
Republic of Germany - 40 Years of the Basic Law. Experience and
Prospects". Subsequent publication in preperation. Distributed
here with the permission of the Drager Foundation.
I appreciate comments from Klaus-Werner Schatz, Karl-Heinz Paque
and Holger Schmieding.1. The Basic Principles
In this paper, we shall not study in detail the concept of the
founding fathers of the social market economy (Miiller-Armack
1966, 1978; Ropke 1958, 1963; Giersch 1960; Watrin 1979) and the
system introduced in 1948. Instead, we shall mainly look at the
social market economy in actual practice ("Verfassungswirklich-
keit"); moreover, we are interested in the challenges the future
holds.
Individual Liberty
Due to the experience of having been under a dictatorship rule
and in accordance with the constitutional history in Europe, the
first articles of the Grundgesetz define the rights of the
individual. The "dignity of man" (Art. 1), "inviolable and
inalienable human rights" (Art. 1), "the right to the free
development of one's personality" (Art. 2), "the right freely to
express and to publish one's opinion by speech" (Art. 5), the
"freedom of movement" (Art. 11), the "rights of ownership and
inheritance" (Art. 14) and many other provisions show that the
corner stone of the Grundgesetz is to respect the decisions of
the individual. In terms of economics, the basic presumption of
the Grundgesetz is that individual preferences should count, that
it is for the individual to decide. One is free to choose what to
consume, whether to consume or save, whether to work or enjoy
leisure, which job to take, where to live, where to travel, and
what to produce for someone else.
Basing the decisions on individual preferences implies confidence
in the sovereignty of the individual. The individual is the best
judge of his own affairs; he or she will weigh the benefits and
costs of a decision, evaluate the risk associated with it and
will have a strong incentive to obtain the relevant information
for his or her choice.,'3
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.A system.that is ultimately .geared towards(the preferences of the
individual^ must have an>institutional mechanism by which-the
individual can voice his ^preferences. The ^institutional vehicle
•is the market or a set of. markets: the competitive .order. If a
market
1:: economy•..-:is established by an adequate institutional
framework:/ the individual can vote with his purse and with his
feet. By giving up income and by spending money on a specific
product and not on alternative products-, the individual clearly
signals his opportunity costs and his marginal willingness to
pay. By choosing one place to live and not another one, he
indicates his willingness to pay for a specific location. By
deciding how many hours to work or not to work, he indicates his
evaluation of work and leisure. When these individual evaluations
are summed up by the market, the value of a good from the point
of view of the demand side is specified.
Economic decentralization not only refers to revealing the
marginal willingness to pay. Markets also allow a decentralized
autonomy of decisions on production and investment; they signal
the incentives to produce. By expressing opportunity costs, i.e.
the costs of an opportunity foregone, the market economy prevents
inefficiency. Firms making a loss have to exit because their
opportunity costs are too high: the resources could be used
better elsewhere.
Information on economic and technical conditions is not
ubiquitous in an economy but is distributed assymmetrically among
the subsystems. Decentralization allows the utilization of
comparative advantages in the generation and processing of
information; it is an incentive to collect and reveal
information. ,t . . ..:-..
The competitive order not only satisfies the conditions for
static efficiency, it,also provides,,for dynamic efficiency. Firms
search for new technical knowledge and look for new possibilities
for investments. Thus, markets are not only a mechanism todisseminate a given set of information, they are an exploratory
device in the sense of Hayek (1968) generating new knowledge.
The competitive order is not explicitly written down in the
constitution. It may be questioned whether it is a principle in
its own right as stated by Eucken (1952, p. 254) who regards it
as the only basic principle, or one may take the view that the
competitive order is instrumental in allowing individual
liberties. Decentralization allows personal choice and provides
options. Thus, decentralization is part of an open society
(Popper 1944). Still, other writers may link the competitive
order to the overall target of efficiency (the economic
principle).
Equity
Besides giving freedom to the individual, the constitution also
protects the individual. Thus, no one is allowed to violate the
right of others (Art. 2); property imposes duties (Art. 14); and
the Federal Republic is a "social federal state" ("Sozialer
Bundesstaat", Art. 20). Equity enters other stipulations in the
constitution such as preventing regional disparities in living
conditions (Art. 72). De facto, there is a strong material
protection of the individual, especially through a net of
mandatory social insurance systems including unemployment,
disability and old age insurance. The market as an allocation
mechanism is corrected in order to attain results which are
socially acceptable.
2. The Social Market Economy as an Economic Order
The principles of individual liberty, competitive order and
equity do not yet fully specify the economic system of the
Federal Republic. The "social market economy" must be understood
as an institutional arrangement defining the rules for the
decision making of households, firms, and the politicians,
including the restraints as well as the incentives.The Concept of Economic Order
Soziale Marktwirtschaft has to be interpreted as a specific form
of a "Wirtschaftsordnung". It is an "ensemble", a frame of
reference, a self-regulating system with the targets of
individual freedom and choice, efficiency through decentralized
autonomy in a competitve order and equity.
A "social market economy may be described as a
permanent search for an economic and social framework,
designed to encourage both an efficient production of
the means of material well-being and personal freedom
in a socially-balanced order" (Watrin 1979, p. 419).
An important strand has developed in the literature of
institutional economics - that of the principal-agent paradigm,
where the principal sets rules that influence the behavior of the
agent, where the principal cannot fully observe the behavior of
the agent, yet where the behavior of the agent determines the
result of the activities. In a way, Wirtschaftsordnunq is a super
principal-agent contract. The principals are (i) the fathers of
the constitution and (ii) the legislature when it has the
appropriate majority for constitutional changes and the normal
majority for other legislative alterations. To some extent, the
judiciary plays the role of the principal when the rules are
interpreted anew. The individuals (the households and the firms)
are the agents that can behave according to the incentive
structure and the institutional framework developed by the
principal. The principal wants to reach its maximum in its
targets of freedom, efficiency and equity, for instance by
maximizing one target subject to restraints from the other
targets. In an optimal solution, the principal will devise rules
so that the optimality conditions of the agent are satisfied.
The description of the Wirtschaftsordnung as a super
principal-agent problem is not yet complete. To some extent, the
voter becomes the principal when he is discontent with the
institutional conditions prevailing and when he wants a change.
However, in contrast to specific policy areas, the rules of thegame require constancy and ought to change only under rare
conditions. This is especially true for constitutional change.
"Denken in Ordnungen"
"Denken in Ordnungen" - to think in terms of an order was a
central demand of the founding fathers of West Germany's social
market economy. They were concerned with the question of how a
small institutional change affects the overall system after all
the households, all the firms and other agents such as the policy
makers have reacted. In a cybernetic context, it is the question
of how the system changes if the rules are slightly altered. This
is analogous to the general equilibrium analysis for an
institutional arrangement (see the concept of "market conformity"
below). It seems to me that this concept of "Denken in Ordnungen"
is not understood by many economists in the United States.
Hutchison (1981, p. 162) may come closest to the concept of
Wirtschaftsordnung by distinguishing between a Ricardian and
Smithian mode of the competitive market economy (Vanberg 1988,
pp. 16 f.). The Ricardian concept stresses
"an abstract, purely economic model of competitive
equilibrium presented as achieving some kind of Utopian
<maximum> or <optimum>",
while the Smithian concept is
"formulated in much broader terms, comprehending the
political and social order" (Hutchison 1979, p.433).
Economic policy in a social market economy has two distinct roles
which are crucially different: to establish and preserve the
economic order (Ordnungspolitik) and to influence economic
processes (Prozeppolitik). Prozefipolitik attempts to modify the
business cycle, growth and allocation in day-to-day or
year-to-year or even longer-term operations, for instance in
providing social overhead capital. Ordnungspolitik refers to theestablishment of property rights, of the incentive system, of the
institutional arrangements and of the rules including the
constitutional conditions. The Ordoliberals who laid down the
intellectual foundations of West Germany's economic order also
argue that the main policy task is Ordnungspolitik, i.e. to
establish the institutional arrangements for a market economy.
Proze/Jpolitik should be limited to special cases.
Eucken (1952) had developed the constituting principles of the
competitive order. Open markets, nowadays the most important
ingredient of the concept of contestable markets (Baumol et al.
1982), are a prerequisite for competition. Private ownership is
both a guarantee of individual liberty and an incentive to
minimize costs and to reveal truly economic information. Freedom
of contract is conducive to competition. Liability ensures that
social costs are internalized. The constancy of economic policy
helps to prevent the intertemporal misallocation of resources,
and price level stability (see below) is a sine qua non for the
price mechanism to operate.
An economic order for the economy as a whole may be interpreted
as consisting of separate partial orders for specific functional
areas (order for the competitive process, monetary system, social
order and labor market) or for specific policy areas (trade
policy, business-cycle policy, agricultural policy). A basic
issue is how these partial orders can be made consistent with
each other (Eucken 1952, p. 304; Kloten 1989, p. 11). A related
problem is how macro policies can be integrated into the order of
2
a social market economy.
The Social Market Economy as an institutional framework has a set
of important requirements that have to be satisfied for the
3
institutional framework to function. These conditions are the
system (market) conformity of policy measures, the defense of
competition, price-level stability and the social order. These
elements can only be understood with the historical experience of
Germany prior to 1945.Interventionlsm, Market Conformity and the Role of State
The German population in general and the intellectual fathers of
the social market economy in particular had experienced an
interventionist state, especially in the thirties and during the
war. It was clear to the majority that a controlled economy
- "une 6conomie dirig6e" -
"had produced an appaling amount of inefficiency"
(Watrin 1979, p. 411).
Therefore, decentralization and a competitive order was called
for.
4
The interventionist experience of the twenties and the thirties
had shown that one intervention would quickly lead to the next.
This is especially true for price regulation, for "example
regulating the price of a standard loaf of bread would quickly
spread like a cancer to all types of bread, including bagels and
croissants, to the labor costs of the baker, to flour, to the
milling process, to wheat, and all other inputs as well as
substitutes for the product. As we know from the present
European agricultural policy, intervention cannot be partially
confined to one specific product, but tends to have side effects
which are seldom recognized prima vista.
A specific intervention may not only affect other markets (via
the interdependence of markets by the potential for substitution
and by complementarity), but intervention may also have an impact
on the market system itself, changing the basic properties of the
allocation mechanism. Therefore, the intellectual founding
fathers of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Eucken, 1952; Miiller-
Armack, 1944, 1946; Ropke, 1942) demanded that policy actions
should be compatible with the market economy ("marktkonform"): in
a narrow interpretation, a policy decision should not induce such
a change or disequilibrium in another market that a new
intervention becomes necessary. In a broader sense, a policy
measure should not change the property of the overall system.It has proven extremely difficult to pinpoint the concept of
market conformity. In a static view, one can quickly see how the
regulation of one market shifts demand or supply to another
market; but in intertemporal decisions such as the choice of a
location, capital accumulation and the depletion of resources it
takes a long time to see impacts. Moreover, the concept of market
conformity is extremely difficult to define with respect to the
impact on the system as a whole (system conformity). Finally, the
concept
"does not provide a conclusive answer to the question as to
what activities the state should fulfill in a free society
and what decisions are reserved to the market" (Watrin 1979
p. 421).
A specific aspect of intervention!sm is the issue of the nati-
onalization of basic industries. This was a prominent topic in
the early days of West Germany, and although it occasionally
flares up, it is not an issue any longer, partly due to the
severe inefficiencies of those German firms which are supposed to
have been oriented towards the common weal (Gemeinwirtschaft) in
the last twenty years, and partly due to the experience in
Eastern Europe.
Apart from the issue of interventionism, the state as a
"Rechtsstaat" is restrained in its activities by a set of rules
and procedures. It has been assigned the role of protecting
individual liberty and of guaranteeing the institutional
arrangement of the competitive order, for instance by competition
policy (see below). Eucken (1952) and Miksch (1937) required a
strong government that could defend the competitive order and
suppress specific interests. The state
"is assigned a crucial role in monitoring the proper
functioning of the competitive process, which, if left
alone, is believed to degenerate due to monopolistic
tendencies and growing disproportions of private power"
(Vanberg 1988, p. 19).10
The state has the producing role according to Buchanan (1975,
p. 68) of providing public goods (or rules for public goods as in
environmental quality management). Moreover, the West German
state has taken over a dominant role with respect to the equity
targets, i.e. in the attempt to produce fairness.
With respect to the proper productive role of the state such as
with public goods, the aggregation of individual preferences by
the market is not possible (free rider), and a political
aggregation mechanism has to substitute for the market process
through voting. Voting is also applied when merit goods, for
instance policy targets, are involved. In deciding on public and
merit goods, a federal structure being based on the subsidiary
principle allows the expression of regional preferences. Thus,
economic decentralization is to some extent accompanied by
political decentralization.
Endogenous Tendencies to Monopolies and a Framework for
Competition
Competition is a necessary condition for an effective
decentralization, but the spontaneity of the market may be
endangered endogenously by the behavior of firms. Profit-
maximizing firms can improve their position by reducing
competition. They can form cartels and engage in other forms of
cooperation in order to reduce competition; they can strive for a
monopoly position by internal growth or can attain a monopolistic
position by mergers. This was the experience in Germany in the
three decades preceding World War I and at the time of the Weimar
republic, reflected in the debate in the late 1920s and early
1930s (Mises 1926; Riistow 1932; Hayek 1944). These potential
endogenous tendencies would severely affect the institutional
setting of a market economy; at the same time, firms could engage
in rent seeking and attempts to influence the institutional
arrangements under which they operated. Historically, the result
was an industrial complex interlinked with the state
("Vermachtung" der Wirtschaft, Kloten 1989, p. II).
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An important framework of the institutional arrangement of a
social market economy is therefore competition policy. Its role
is to guarantee that competition is not eroded endogenously by
principally ruling out cartels, by controling mergers and by
surveilling the abuse of a monopolistic position. But other
important aspects include free market entry to keep markets
contestable and an open economy to allow competition from abroad.
Inflationary Experience and the Independence of the Bundesbank
Germany has gone through two big inflations: the hyperinflation
of 1923 and the repressed inflation from 1936-1948. Inflation
generates severe repercussions from distorting allocation and
especially from hurting those individuals with a fixed nominal
income, for instance wage earners. Inflation can therefore be a
danger to an economic system, it can lead to a political
destabilization of society, and it violates the condition of
constancy of economic policy. For these reasons, price-level
stability is an important target of economic policy; the
Bundesbank was institutionalized as an independent central bank.
The government cannot monetize its budget deficit by taking
recourse to the central bank.
These provisions are not part of the constitution, but of the
Bundesbankgesetz. It is interesting to note that the actual
position of the Bundesbank is not only defined by the legal rules
but by a consensus in the population. This more or less holds for
other aspects of the institutional system as well. If the consen-
sus changes, the institutional setting may vary.
The "Social Question" and the Social Order
The late 19 th and the early 20th centuries in Europe were
dominated by the social question. Industrialization, new forms of
production, the ^migration from the countryside to the industrial
locations gave rise to social problems. Socialist movements
claimed to have found an answer to how economic efficiency and12
progress and personal freedom could be obtained by the public
ownership of means of production and central planning. The social
ethics of the Catholic church centered on improving the
conditions of human life. From this historical perspective, any
economic system has to provide an answer to the social question,
both from an ethical point of view and from a practical one.
There must be some consensus on the economic system.
The experience with a central collectivist planning system in
Europe was that such a system did not deliver the promises made;
it did not protect the worker as an individual but rather it
required an Orwellian-type control of the individual worker, for
instance in limiting his choice of work place or controlling what
type of work he did in order to allocate food stamps in a
rationing system. Thus, introducing the market economy in 1948
was in itself a social reform. The system provided economic
opportunities and choices.
Besides stressing this positive property of the market economy,
the attribute "social" market economy refers to the basic
position of at least some of the Ordoliberals that the allocation
process by markets may lead to an income and wealth distribution
that warrants correction (Vanberg 1988, p. 20). An important
aspect of this can be found in the social insurance schemes which
were started in the 1880s and have been further developed in the
40 years of the Federal Republic. The "productive state"
(Buchanan 1975, p. 68) has gained a more important role;
moreover, the worker participated in economic growth - to wit the
wage drift in the fifties and sixties - and he was integrated in
economic terms by acquiring real (houses) and financial wealth.
Finally, the issue of the position of the workman of the last
century had changed. With 54.9 percent of the work force in
service activities (including 20.1 percent in government) and
only 40.1 in industry (Statistisches Bundesamt 1989), the social
question of the 19th century has disappeared from the center of
the stage.13
Bibliothek
des Instituts fur Welfwirtschaft
3. Trends and Challenges: How do the Principles Work?
How has the social market economy performed in its 40 years? Can
we recognize trends? Is there a slow erosion of the "social
market order" (Bernholz 1979; Klump 1985; Tuchtfeldt 1973;
Vanberg 1988?; Willgerodt 1988). Is the German economy still a
social market economy (Kloten 1989, p. 14)? And what will be the
challenges of the future?
Policy Targets
From a historical perspective, the social market economy has done
well in generating products, in stimulating technical change and
providing high rates of economic growth. At 8 percent, the growth
rate of real GNP was high in the early fifties; it has come down
to 3 percent in the late eighties (4 percent in the sixties, 3,5
percent in the seventies and a slump in the early eighties). The
unemployment rate was originally high, but it was reduced quickly
in the fifties and remained very low up to 1974, rising steadily
thereafter to a high level of nearly 9 percent. Inflation was
nonexistent in the fifties (except in 1951) and sixties, but it
increased in the seventies and the early eighties.14
Table 1 - Macroeconomic Variables, Federal Republic of Germany
(five-year average)
Real growth Unemployment Inflation








































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1975); Sachverstandigenrat zur
Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (1988)..15
External Shocks
A tremendous initial challenge was the inflow of 12 million
refugees. Employment and housing had to be provided;
infrastructure had to be supplied, and the refugees had to be
integrated into society. Overall, the system fared pretty well.
Another shock was provided by the two oil crises of the
seventies, and though there were some voices not trusting the
market, the market mechanism did pretty well in adjusting to this
scarcity shock.
All in all, the Federal Republic underwent a stark change in its
sectoral structure by strongly reducing employment in
agriculture, by a continuous rise of the service activities and,
since 1970, by a relative decline in manufacturing
(Siebert 1989a). There is an overall consensus that the German
economy, being heavily dependent on foreign trade, has to adjust
to the changes in the world economy.
The Conflict between the Principles
There is a broad range of problems where the basic principles of
personal liberty, the competitive order and equity are in har-
mony. Thus, the competitive order is instrumental in allowing
personal freedom and in contributing towards a solution to the
social question. But there are problems where the basic
principles are in conflict and where a balance between efficiency
and equity has to be found. This problem of finding a balance is
a continuous process, and the opportunity costs of solutions will
become only apparent over time. Since it is an important issue,
the overall features of the social market economy should not be
destroyed. There are five areas where these overall features are
challenged, namely through subsidies and distortions, the size of
the government, regulation, rent seeking and specifically through
social regulation.16
Subsidies and Distortions. Sectorial adjustments have been
dampened by subsidies for ailing industries like coal,
shipbuilding, and steel. Subsidized sectors are typically
characterized by a small number of firms, low growth, strong
import penetration and a historically high level of protection.
Most subsidized or protected sectors used to have a large number
of employees (and voters), but today they are in fact quite
capital intensive (mining, steel, shipbuilding, and even parts of
textiles and clothing). Shielding workers from too strong
structural adjustments is a specific motive, and rent-seeking is
a good explanation.
In the coal industry, a work place is subsidized by 35,000 DM per
annum (1986) which amounts to 57 percent of the average total
labor costs per person employed in this industry (Kiel Institute
of World Economics, own calculations). Subsidies have severely
changed the position of individual firms, for instance
subsidizing Arbed has severely affected the private producer
Korf. They have distorted the sectoral structure and they have
retarded the adjustment of sectors and whole regions. Their most
detrimental impact has been to ward off the location of new
industries, for instance by preventing lower wages in regions
with ailing industries and by their impact on the planning of
land use (Siebert 1989a). Politicians have not been courageous at
all in reducing subsidies, and a sunset law for subsidies has
never been tried.
A defensive sectoral policy for ailing sectors is not the only
case of distortion. Industrial targeting may become the more rel-
evant area. Politicians do not trust the market to develop new
sectors, and they claim to know better in which sectors to place
capital, including public funds. This appeal of strategic trade
policy extends beyond subsidies. In the eyes of the European Com-
mission, competition policy can be more generous vis-a-vis larger
units if they fit into the strategic trade policy concepts.
Experience with promoting new sectors in Germany artificially,
for instance subsidizing the development of nuclear plants and17
larger computers, is disappointing. Cycles of interventionism
have been observed in government activities, for instance in town
planning (Siebert 1980, p. 368). There is no doubt that strategic
trade policy is a threat to the market economy, because
decentralized private decisions are substituted by a political
process. Strategic trade theory seems to be so fascinating for
the political area that the concept of "Wirtschaftsordnung" tends
to move into the background.
The experience with subsidies is disillusioning. The amount of
subsidies is high, being estimated at 133 bill DM for 1989, that
is 5.9 percent of GNP (Kiel Institute of World Economics, own
calculations) and not too far from the wage income tax receipts
(182 bill DM, 1989), the most important single tax in Germany.
The risk of the system as a whole is that specific interest
groups may be able to dominate the state. An institutional check
on subsidies and distortions would consist of clearly defining
the role of government in a market economy, especially its
allocative function to provide social overhead capital (technical
infrastructure) and other public goods (basic research) as well
as financing (taxation schemes). A compulsory depreciation rule
for subsidies may be a powerful tool.
Privatization and the Role of Government. The share of government
expenditures in GNP may be considered to be an indicator of the
role of the government in a market economy. For the Federal
Republic, it has moved around 48 percent in the last 15 years
with a peak in 1982 (50 percent). In the late 1980s, there was a
small decline. A large part (18.5 percentage points) is made up
of the social security system with an increasing upwards trend.
Public enterprises are mainly engaged in electricities, gas,
water, local and urban transportation services, railways,
communication, residential construction and some areas of
manufacturing. They account for 7 percent of employment and
roughly 15 percent of gross investment in the Federal Republic of
Germany (Europaischer Zentralverband der offentlichen Wirtschaft
1987, pp. 35, 37). The privatization of public firms has been
rather timid.18
Constitutional checks on the size of government, on governmental
expenditures or on financing may be the appropriate answer to the
tendency of the government to take over a larger role in a market
economy.
Regulation. Regulation of industry and services has occurred in
many areas, namely in all sectors that have received exemptions
from the German antitrust law (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschran-
kungen), agriculture, the coal and the iron industry, banking and
insurance, transportation and communication (including the postal
service and public electricity, gas and water utilities).
Moreover, regulations apply to environmental protection and to
many other aspects such as the health system and information
media (Donges and Schatz 1986).
The basic feature of regulation is to exclude competition and to
limit market access. It has been estimated that, measured in
terms of value added, roughly 50 percent of the German economy is
severely regulated (Donges and Schatz 1986, pp. 26 f). In order
to prevent excessive profits from being gained out of the
monopolistic position created by regulation, in some important
cases the setting of prices is also controlled. In many cases,
however, the right of a restricted market entry is given away for
free, for instance when limited emission rights are de facto
granted at a zero price.
Arguments for regulation are natural monopolies, protection of
the consumer and the internalization of externalities. The basic
question is to what extent these arguments are valid and to what
extent regulation really is in the interest of the individual.
Besides the primary effects of higher prices due to reduced
competition, regulation tends to have side effects that may not
be apparent at a first glance. For instance, the German
regulation of trucking has increased the comparative advantage of
Dutch truckers and has shifted locational advantage away from the
North German ports. Moreover, regulation of trucking, for
instance forbidding market entry to the trucking division of
producing firms or cabotage rules for foreign truckers, generatesexcess traffic which is not consistent with energy conservation
or environmental protection.
One way out would be to auction off access rights whenever these
rights can be linked to quantities, for instance auctioning off
emission rights, the right to participate in a stock exchange,
and the right to provide a transportation service. The other way
out is explicitly to allow market access. This is especially im-
portant in the light of new concepts of competition such as con-
testable markets. Europe '92 may be a way to improve market
access.
A challenge for the market economy will be to revise the exemp-
tions from the German antitrust law. In banking and insurance,
the protection of the customer (Anlegerschutz, Glaubigerschutz)
should not be attained by limiting market access. Stock exchanges
should be opened to more competition. In the case of the postal
service we see a modest structural change including a more open
market in final products. In electricity, new property rights for
common carriers will have to be developed to allow competition.
Finally, in the transportation sector, deregulation is possible
in trucking and in airlines (Donges and Schatz 1986; Soltwedel et
al. 1986). In all these areas and in other regulated fields
(coal, steel, crafts) a huge potential for deregulation exists.
Rent-seeking. Subsidies may be controled by sunset laws, and
excessive government expenditures may be checked by rules of
financing. Competition policy is the answer to an endogenous
tendency to encroach upon competition by establishing
noncompetitive market positions. What is the institutional
response to rent-seeking by which the frame of reference for
private decisions is altered and by which partial orders are
politicized? Linked to this issue of rent-seeking is the problem
of economic power and of vested interests (Kloten 1989, p. 15).
Apparently, a systematic institutional check on rent-seeking does
not exist. Competition policy of the traditional type, relating
to positions in the relevant market, is not the adequate answer.
Guaranteeing free market access in order to keep markets
contestable is an important step against rent-seeking. But it20
does not seem to be a sufficient institutional safeguard because
rents are determined by many factors including favorable
institutional (legal) conditions of operation. To think in terms
of an economic order - "Denken in Ordnungen" - may be a guarantee
against special interests of subgroups of society and against
rent-seeking - but there may be some indications that this
philosophy is losing ground (Kloten 1989, p. 15).
Protection of the Individual versus Flexibility. The regulation
of the labor market has its roots in the intention to protect the
individual. Labor market regulation consists of three basic
aspects: (i) governmental insurance schemes if people are
unemployed (ill, disabled and retired), (ii) lay-off restraints,
and (iii) the delegation of bargaining for the wage contract to
the employer's and employee's organizations with the bargaining
solution de facto becoming law and being mandatory for all em-
ployees, including trade union non-members ("Allgemeinverbind-
lichkeit").
This system of regulation implicitly defines the incentives to
supply and demand labor. The incentives work in the direction of
reducing the demand for labor and uncoupling employment and
growth as well as investment and employment. This is a deficiency
of the system. As is the case for any insurance, social
insurance gives rise to moral hazard behavior of those insured.
Lay-off restraints explicitly define exit conditions and
implicitly stipulate entry conditions by influencing the demand
for labor (Siebert 1989b). Generalized wage bargaining allowing
an organizational integration of the employees prevents a
differentiation of wages according to occupation, sectors and
regions. Moreover, the three types of regulation interact with
each other. For instance, social security and lay-off regulations
define the bargaining position of the trade unions.
Besides problems of moral hazard behavior, a regulating system
protecting the individual may also give rise to a different
attitude of individuals: they expect individual protection from
the government and the regulatory system, and they tend to think21
in terms of aspirations against the government. There is a
trade-off between the insider and the outsider, but much more
important, there is a trade-off between individual protection and
the open society characterized by Popper (1944, p. 174) as
"competition for status among its members".
Definitely, there is a conflict between individual protection and
the efficiency or flexibility of the system. This is possibly
best documented in the discussion on the closing hours of stores
(LadenschluPgesetz). On the whole, politicians have not been
courageous in allowing or initiating more flexibility.
Erosion of the Market Mechanism. Subsidies for ailing and new
industries, some forms of regulation, rent-seeking and the
reduced flexibility in the labor market point out that the market
mechanism is being endogenously eroded in a slow process. From
hindsight such a process may have been checked better if the
market economy had been explicitly laid down in the Basic Law.
Not having such a constitutional anchor, the legal system has
been indifferent to the problem of "Marktkonformitat" with
respect to the system as a whole. Here is an open question:
g
"Denken in Ordnungen" may not be sufficient as a defense.
Institutional Competition versus European Centralization
The institutional framework of Germany's social market economy
will be affected by European integration, especially by the
Single Market. There is a consensus to enter the Single market,
but there is also some awareness that European integration may
change the rules of the game. A little bit reminiscent of the
discussion in the 1960s on the role of "planification", there is
a debate on whether the institutional setting for Europe has to
be defined centrally in Brussels or whether it can be delegated
to a process of institutional competition.22
Institutional competition means that different national institu-
tional arrangements can exist simultaneously in a single market
and that the rules of the country of origin (for a product or a
service) are mutually recognized. The implication of institution-
al competition is the arbitrage of consumers and firms. Consumers
vote with their purses and their feet and firms take advantage of
differentials in national regulations. Countries compete for the
mobile factors of production, and the emerging institutional
setting is the result of an open-ended process. The most
important impact of institutional competition will be to open up
markets that so far have been closed due to national regulation.
The conflict between the strategies of institutional competition
versus prior harmonization is an expression of a more deeper
conflict of orientation: on a constitutional level, it is the
conflict of federalism versus centralization. On a philosophical
level, it is the conflict between liberalism in the classical or
British sense versus a more planning-oriented approach. We here
have diverging views on such issues as confidence in the
functioning of markets or any type of interventionism,
sovereignity of the consumer or the need for his or her
"protection", the role and the size of the government,
spontaneity of autonomous decision making and decentralized
processes versus constructivism, or the English case law versus
the logic of the Roman law. Europe is in a search of its
institutions, and the showdown between the British and the French
concept of Europe is still to come.
Nature and Environment
A fascinating issue is how the institutional system has dealt
with the challenge of environmental disruption which was not
recognized until the early 1970s. In terms of the economist, the
environment became to be perceived as a scarce good being used
for the competitive uses of consumption and of receiving wastes.
For our analysis it does not matter whether preferences for
environmental quality have changed or whether the demand for the
assimilative services of the environment has increased. There wasa shock to the system, not exogenous as in the oil crisis, but
endogenous.
Institutionally, the system reacted by attempting to create new
property rights for the use of the environment as a waste
receptacle and by signalling environmental scarcity to the
subsystems of the economy. New laws for air quality management
(Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz, TA Luft, Abwasserabgabengesetz
etc.) were introduced in the early 1970s and revised in the
mid-1980s. Admittedly, these laws predominantly used the
regulatory (licencing) approach to the environmental issue, but a
debate has been going on in 1989 on institutional arrangements
for environmental incentives. A new institutional arrangement has
to be developed which puts a greater emphasis on price
instruments. There is also the issue of a constitutional
amendment with respect to the environment. I think one can be
confident that the institutional arrangement can be changed to
accommodate the environmental problem.
A challenge for an institutional setting is how it accommodates
the vital interest of future generations (Siebert 1980). In the
case of capital accumulation this issue can be left to private
decisions. The value of a capital good can be sold by the
generation retiring from production to the next generation. For
the environment, new property rights have to be found that take
the interest of future generations into account. The accumulation
of pollutants over a time period of ten or twenty years in the
environmental system has to be reflected in the price system. It
will be a special challenge to the social market economy how
strict irreversibilities will be incorporated into an
institutional framework allowing a preventive environmental
policy.
4. Conclusions
Looking back over fourty years of Soziale Marktwirtschaft, the
system has fared pretty well. It has allowed economic well-being,
individual autonomy and an ample net of social security. It was24
not questioned by public opinion in Germany after having been
accepted by the major parties. In a time of an Orwellian crisis
of socialist planning in Eastern Europe, the relative merit of
the social market economy is all but too apparent. As a matter of
fact, the concept of social market economy with its principles
may provide an orientation for the east European countries in
their search for a better institutional setting for their
economies. Institutional competition in Europe, if it is allowed
to come into being, will be an envigorating stimulus for the
system.
The social market economy has reacted as well to external shocks
as to the inflow of refugees and the energy crises, and one can
be confident that the environmental issue can be integrated into
the system. What is now of concern is that the system will be
slowly eroded endogenously by subsidies for ailing industries and
by strategic trade and industry policy, by regulations favoring
specific interests, by rent-seeking, by the inflexibilities in
the labor market and by the conflict between a political demand
to be secured by government and the overall necessity to have an
open society allowing individual liberty.25
Footnotes
Germans tend to become very "grundsStzlich" on terms. For Eucken
(1952, p. 252) a principle was a basic demand as a guide to
action, not the goal itself.
2
See the discussion in the 1960s (Kloten 1989, pp. 12, 13).
I do not quite follow Eucken's four regulating principles. His
fourth problem, namely inverse supply reaction, is not a major
issue. His third problem that prices correctly reflect scarcity
is a dominating issue (see section on Nature and Environment,
p. 22) .
4
In the early years of the Federal Republic strong political
forces favored a centralization and some type of central
planning.
If you do not like the old-fashioned example, look for natural
gas price regulations in the United States in the 1970s and
1980s and some phenomena in trade policy such as upgrading or
local content rules as a consequence of quantitative
restrictions.
"Es erwies sich, da|3 die Gewahrung von Freiheit eine Gefahr fur
die Freiheit werden kann, wenn sie die Bildung privater Macht
ermoglicht, daj3 zwar au/3erordentliche Energien durch sie geweckt
werden, aber daj3 diese Energien auch freiheitszerstorend wirken
konnen" (Eucken 1952, p. 53).
The problem of political power (Macht) was a central issue to
the Ordoliberals (Eucken 1952, p. 169).
o
"In der Sozialordnung gibt es zahlreiche, damals unterschatzte,
sich spater als schwerwiegend erweisende konstruktive Mangel"
(Kloten 1989, p. 12).
q
Possibly, fiscal federalism both in a spatial and a functional
interpretation is an answer. By linking taxation and government
financing to the supply of public goods the voter can see what
the government is providing. This relates to the regional
dimension of public goods (and financing) where regions decide
on their public goods and the financing. It refers to the
splitting up of some government services (railroads, postal
services) into an infrastructure company owning the tracks or
telephone lines and operating companies which can be private.
And it also implies a financing through user charges wherever
possible.26
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